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Statement of T. Coleman Andrews, president of the
American Institute of Accountants, 270 Madison Ave.,
New York City, before the Senate Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments, May 15, 1951.

Mrs. Smith and Gentlemen:

I am here to speak for myself and as president of the American Institute
of Accountants in response to invitations addressed to me in both capacities by

your distinguished chairman.

Both the American Institute of Accountants and I appreciate and thank you

for your invitation, and we have accepted this invitation because the subject of
S.913 is one concerning which we feel that we are in position to speak with some
claim to special knowledge, for fiscal problems are the certified public ac

countants' daily fare.
This is as true of the Federal Government's fiscal problems as it is of

those of private enterprises, for the accounting profession has contributed

liberally, in peace as well as in war, not only the rank and file of its membership
but also its leaders, toward finding solutions for the Government's constant

succession of fiscal difficulties.

Being aware of your distinguished chairman's interest in simplification
and economy, we are reluctant to raise our voice in opposition to a bill authored
by him and intended to help deal more intelligently with the perplexing problem

of judging and passing upon appropriation requests.

However, we do not believe

that S.913 will either simplify the present situation or effect any economy.
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We believe, on the contrary, that it will further complicate what appears

to us to be an already over-organized, unduly complex, and dangerously obfuscated
situation, and, in addition, add substantially to the already intolerable cost of

managing the nations's business.
Worse still, if S.913 should have these undesirable effects, it will add
to the growing loss of confidence and faith in the government and those who run it
that now is apparent to every discerning citizen.

We urgently suggest that there is bound to be a point beyond which the
people will not be willing to go in their tolerance of consistently unsuccessful

experimentation with the job of gaining and maintaining control of the fiscal

aspects of their national affairs.

Business, both large and small—even business

that is world-wide in its operations—licked the problem of fiscal control long ago.
Sooner or later the people will cease to tolerate the government’s failure to deal

effectively with the aspect of management.

We cannot longer afford the “trial-and -

error” method of dealing with a problem that is no longer a problem anywhere except
in government.

We heartily agree with the declaration by Senator McClellan at the outset
of his address to the Senate concerning S.913 on February 19, 1951, that Congression
al control over the expenditures of the Executive Branch of the Government is much
needed; and we applaud his further declaration that Congress’s possession of control

over the Government’s expenditures heightens its duty in times like these “to

appropriate only as much (as), but no more than, is actually needed.”

We also agree with the Senator’s declaration further along in the same
address that the budget hearings held by the Appropriations Committee of Congress

have become practically “ex parte” proceedings.

But, considering the fact that the

Appropriations Committees of Congress have had at their elbows a means, established
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30 years ago, whereby this deplorable evolution might have been avoided, it is
somewhat disappointing that for so long a time the full usefulness of this fine

and proven tool not only has not yet been employed but apparently has not even
been recognized.

More’s the pity when we consider that this tool was created by

Congress itself, to be its eyes and ears in fiscal matters.

But this is getting

a little ahead of our story.
At first blush, the idea of having a ’’Joint Committee on the Budget”

sounds like a good one.

But on analysis, it becomes clear that, in some of its

activities at least, a merry-go-round situation would be created.

For instance,

we find, beginning in line 16 on page 4 of S.913 that one of the duties of the
Joint Committee would be:

”(c) to consider all available information relating
to estimated revenues, including revenue esti
mates of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation * * *”
This sounds like hiring auditors to check auditors; the Joint Committee

on Internal Revenue Taxation checks the Treasury Department—it just recently re
ported that the Treasury Department’s current revenue estimates were too low—and

the Joint Committee on the Budget would check the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation.

This would be duplication of the most inexcusable sort.

The idea of creating a Joint Committee on the Budget from the Appropriations

Committees of House and Senate, similar to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue

Taxation, is appealing at first glance.

But actually the parallel is misleading.

Under the Constitution all revenue bills must originate in the House of
Representatives, and the Senate can in effect originate methods of raising revenue
only by the expedient of amending House bills.

The Joint Committee on Internal

Revenue Taxation was created primarily as a means of avoiding the difficulties
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and delays which often resulted from this Constitutional provision.
No such special problem justifies the creation of a Joint Committee on

the Budget from the Appropriations Committees of the two houses.

On the contrary,

it might well lead to circumventing the checks and balances on appropriations which
now exist through separate

consideration of appropriations bills by the House of

Representatives and the Senate.

Now to be more specific.

On page 3 of his Senate address of February 19,

1951, Senator McClellan called his colleagues’ attention to the fact that the
Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate had a combined staff of 55

persons, whereas Congress had given the Bureau of the Budget a staff of more than
500.
”What the Senator was getting at here is not clear to us.

Surely he could

not have been suggesting that if the Bureau of the Budget needs a staff of 500 the
proposed Joint Committee on the Budget would have to have one of that number*

The

only clue he gave to the proposed Joint Committee’s needs is to be found on page 6
of the same address, where he said that ’’This Joint Committee would be empowered
to employ an adequate expert staff ***.”

An "adequate expert "staff” might easily

become a full-blown Congressional Bureau of the Budget.
Agreeing, as we said earlier, with your distinguished Chairman’s
declaration that Congress needs to get control over the expenditures of the Executive

Branch of the Government, we would not argue for maintaining the status quo; but

we believe that we should say in passing that we think that a good case could be
made for the proposition that the better than l-to-10 ratio of the combined staffs

of the Appropriations Committees of Congress to the staff of the Bureau of the Budget

is ample.

One expert certainly ought to be able to check the finished work of ten

others. If what we recommend in place of S.913 is adopted, some of the 55 members
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of the staffs of the Appropriations Committees of Congress may find themselves

hard put to keep busy with budget matters.
In his address of February 19, Senator McClellan pointed out that the
Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate have authority under the Legisla

tive Reorganization Act of 1946 to expand their staffs ”in order to make a more
systematic and intensive analysis of departmental spending requests”

but that

neither of these committees had fully availed itself of this authority.
He then also pointed out that if these committees should take advantage
of their authority to expand their staffs they would create a duplication of service

and expense.
Next he asserted that there are only two approaches to solution (of the

problem of putting Congress in the saddle with a stout bridle and a bit that would
really enable it to control expenditures).

"One,” he said, ”is by having each of

the Appropriations Committees adequately expand its staff and confer additional
authority and powers on the staffs of the two Committees to perform these services.

The other *** is the approach made in the bill which I have introduced. ”

The Senator’s reminder that the maintaining of a staff for the same purpose
by each of the two Appropriations Committees would be a duplication of both service

and expense is not open to question.

Nor can there be any doubt that a single

staff for review of the administration’s proposed and actual expenditures is highly

desirable and would be tremendously helpful;

such a staff would provide a check

on expenditures such as is now provided on revenues by the staff of the Joint

Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.
But the staffs of the two Appropriations Committees already duplicate

each other to a degree, and the past affords no hope that this duplication would
be ended by the adoption of S.913.

Moreover, there is a better way—a proven one—
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one that already is at hand and, therefore,
zation unnecessary.

makes the creation of a new organ

Hence, we disagree with the Senator’s statement that the course

laid out in S.913 is the only alternative to parallel expansion of the staffs
of the two Appropriations Committees.

Our suggestion is a very simple ones
THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.

USE THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL AND

The arguments in favor of this course are so

obvious and compelling that it seems hardly necessary even to state them; but here

are a few:
1.

The Comptroller General and the staff of the
General Accounting Office stand second to none
in knowledge of the organization and management
of the Government. They’ve been reviewing the
Government’s affairs most meticulously for the
past 30 years.

2.

They would be moving at full speed before any
new organization could get up enough steam to
get started.

3.

The Comptroller General is a member of the
Congressional family. Use him.

4.

The services that the staff of the proposed
Joint Committee on the Budget would render
are among those that the General Accounting
Office was created to render to Congress.
Let the General Accounting Office render these
services.

5.

Use of the Comptroller General and the General
Accounting Office would give the staffs of the
Appropriations Committees the help of people
who are out in the front lines of fiscal oper
ations every dayand who not only know what’s
going on but also how to interpret what they
see in terms of economical organization and
management.
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6.

Use of the Comptroller General and the General
Accounting Office would employ existing person
nel and facilities and thus would avoid making
things more complicated and costly than they
already are.

7.

Proper employment of the facilities of the
General Accounting Office should reduce
substantially the time devoted to budget
matters by the staffs of the Appropriations
Committees.

What more appropriate organization than the General Accounting Office
could possibly be found to provide the Appropriations Committees and Congress with

the information they require in order to determine whether the appropriations re

quested by the administration are necessary and reasonable?

The staff of this

establishment has been reviewing the revenues and expenditures of the Government

for the past thirty years.
True enough, the review was on a pretty narrow basis until the Government

Corporation Control Act was passed in 1945.

But every transaction was reviewed;

and since the passage of the Government Corporation Control Act the basis of the
examinations conducted has been steadily broadened, until today in every examination

the auditors not only inquire into the legality of expenditures but also weigh them
from the standpoint of whether they were necessary.

They also consider whether the

activities that they review are economically organized as well as whether they are
economically managed.

But one doesn't have to argue the logic of using the Comptroller General
and the General Accounting Office.

be used.

Congress has already twice said that they shall

It did so when it passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.

it again when it passed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.

It did

Unfortunately,

however, Congress has never used the tools that it thus provided and has had at hand.
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Here, for instance, is what section 206 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of

1946 says:

"Section 206. The Comptroller General is authorized and
directed to make an expenditure analysis of each
agency in the executive branch of the Government
(including Government corporations), which, in the
opinion of the Comptroller General, will enable
Congress to determine whether public funds have been
economically and efficiently administered and expended * * * * * * * * ." (Underscoring ours)

We suggest that no group is likely to become better qualified to analyze
plans for future expenditures than those whose business it is to ascertain and

report to Congress whether public funds previously appropriated have been

economically and efficiently administered and expended.

Those who know the past

are most likely to be the best judges of the future.
So there you have it.

BY EXISTING LAW:

WHAT S.913 WOULD PROVIDE ALREADY IS REQUIRED

Moreover, to a degree it is being provided in audits now being

made by the General Accounting Office.

BUT CONGRESS ISN’T USING IT:

Congress is

fond of calling the Comptroller General its ’’right arm” and its ”watchdog.”

The

moving finger of that right arm oft has become cramped from its prodigious report
writing, and the watchdog’s throat equally as often has been hoarsened by the

vigorous warnings it has barked; but Congress seldom has either seen or heard
these emanations from the hand and throat of its diligent and faithful servant
in the cloistered and crowded depths of the Old Pension Building, or so it has

seemed.

Often has the Comptroller General been heard to say proudly yet sadly,

as he did at a Senate sub-committee hearing on his appropriation requests for the
year ended June 30, 1950:
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”I might say that I have sent more reports to the
Congress on waste and extravagance in one year than
my predecessors sent during their entire terms of
office.”
I should point out, lest someone get the erroneous impression that I am

saying that the Comptroller General has not done his duty under Section 206 of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, that this directive never has been imple

mented by an appropriation.

The record indicates that $1,000,000 was requested

for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1948, for initiation of the work called for by

this section, but this request was denied by the Independent Offices Subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee.

In reporting on this denial, Congressman

Wigglesworth, Chairman of the Independent Offices Subcommittee of the House

Appropriations Committee, had this to says
"The Committee feels that with the assistance already
being furnished by the General Accounting Office in its
regular reports and otherwise to Congress and to many
of its committees, and with the additional help now
available in the augmented committee staffs, no ad
ditional appropriation to enable the General Accounting
Office to begin its new duties under Section 206 of the
Legislative Reorganization Act can be justified at this
time.
”The Committee believes that if such expenditures ana
lyses are to be made on such a scale ^y a permanent
staff it should be done by the General Accounting Office.

I have discussed this matter with the Comptroller General
and he does not object to the elimination of the item of
$1,000,000, under all the circumstances involved, provided
it is understood that his office cannot begin work pur
suant to this new function unless and until an appropria
tion is made therefor at some later time. I think this,
of course, will be clearly understood. ”
Congressional Record, Vol. 93, Part 6, Page 7175,
June 17, 1947
(Underscoring ours)
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As we understand it, the Senate, in considering the Independent Offices

Appropriations Act of 1950, added $800,000 to the General Accounting Office’s
appropriation for initiating the work required under Section 206 of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, but this $800,000 was stricken from the bill in con
ference and so was not included in the 1950 appropriation as finally approved.

Thus, it is apparent that the General Accounting Office never has been
given any money to carry out the directive given to the Comptroller General by
Section 206 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.

However, the directive

remains on the statute books, and we understand that in spite of not having been

given funds to carry it out the Comptroller General has nevertheless so drawn his
audit programs that at least some of the expenditure analyses required by this

section will be made— in fact, are now being made—in the course of his staff’s
discharge of its regular auditing duties.

Finally, it must be pointed out that if it were decided to use the

Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office to do what is provided by
S.913, even this salutary step might duplicate investigative work now being done

by staffs of committees of Congress and by the legislative staff located in the
Library of Congress.

The same would be true, of course, if S.913 were adopted.

But Congress can very quickly terminate this duplication by requiring that all
investigations of fiscal matters be referred to the Comptroller General and the
General Accounting Office, and we strongly urge that this be done.

The Comptroller

General is Congress’s man; he and the staff of the General Accounting Office work
for and report to Congress, and their qualifications for making fiscal examinations

and investigations are of the very highest order.
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To summarize, we heartily concur in the opinion that control of

appropriations by the Executive Branch of the Government is dangerous and in

tolerable and that Congress should move without further delay to cure its surrender
of this vital prerogative.

But we strongly urge:

(a)

That creation of a Joint Committee on the Budget
is unnecessary and would worsen rather than im
prove the present situation;

(b)

That full advantage should be taken of the poten
tialities of the Comptroller General and the
General Accounting Office as the independent
auditor and investigator for Congress;

(c)

That, specifically, the Comptroller General and
the General Accounting Office be used to provide
the Congress with the services called for by
S.913; and

(d)

That the conducting of all investigations of fiscal
matters be entrusted to the Comptroller General and
the General Accounting Office.

Last year I testified before this Committee in opposition to a bill that
became the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950.

I objected to this bill

on several grounds—primarily on the grounds that it failed to provide an account
ing department for the government under a qualified director and that it unduly and

improperly made the Comptroller General a party to administrative decisions that
should never be imposed upon any independent auditor.

I pointed out that if the

Comptroller General were to be in fact the independent auditor for Congress and as

such a member of the Congressional family, he should be used accordingly and should
be relieved of his part in the management of those affairs that should be regarded
as—and made—the exclusive responsibility of the Executive Branch of the government.

There were some who chose to assail that testimony as an effort on our

part to reduce the importance and prestige of the Comptroller General’s office.
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because these recommendations make specific application of the philosophy upon
which what we said on that occasion was based.

We sought then, and we seek today,

to prevail upon the Congress to avail itself of all of the potential usefulness

of an officer and of the staff of an organization who are Congress's own, and who
could be made not only more useful to Congress than they now are—and their present

usefulness is undeniably great—but also the most powerful influence for public
thrift at the national level that the country has ever seen.

We say this with the deepest sincerity and with some emotion, because we
entertain grave concern about what will happen if the present costly situation is
not corrected.
So we say:

We already have the man, the organization, and the law that

it takes to do what is called for by S.913.

Let’s not make the mistake of piling

more organization on top of the present bewildering colossus and more expense on

top of the already inordinate cost of government.
good enough; it is exceptionally good.

use it

What we already have isn’t Just

All we have to do is use it.

So, let's

